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BRUlilTON V. SUPERIOR COURT

[20C. (2d)

Apr. 1942]

BRUNTON V. SUPERIOR COURT
[200, (2d) 202J

, [L. A. No. 18140. In Bank. Apr. 21, 1942.]

WILLIAl\l J. BRUNTON, as City Council Member; etc., et aI.,
, , Petitioners,' v.THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS
ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent.
·':'

[1], 'Qontemph-:Certiorari.-The jurisdiction of a lower court to
\".:

~;:'

, ',isSlue,a final judgment, of contempt may, be reviewed on cer, ,', tiorari. The question as to whether the a/lts complained of
, ,,' can, constitute. a contempt is a jurisdictional one for the pur, 'pose~ of such review.
'
[~l. :tD.iunctions-Violation-Certainty.-To authorize holding a'
. , 'person guilty of c'ontempt for violating an injunction, the acts
',: ; constituting the contempt must be clearly and specifically pro,; hibited by the terms of the injunction. One cannot be held
guilty of contempt for violating an injunction that is uncertain or ambiguous.
[3a, '.Sb]' Id, - Violation.:.-Acts Constituting-Collecting Fees.,,,,.Where an injunction by its terms enjoins the collection of
, ,. ,feee, fQr oil permits required by certain ordinances, and there
,)~~,nl?)ndication of a~illtent to prohibit the charging of fees :.)
.) ,}fj'ffider: a~y !>ther ord~nance, an attempt to ,collect fees. under '
, new,,' ordinances that' are materially different does not constituteJa>rlolation of the injunction punishable as for contempt.
[4~'i':J;~~~~f~l?istin~tio~&::-:"PriVilege Tax.-If a fe~ ~or a permit
') . ,t<)' Orilloil 18a tax, It 'IS but a tax upon the prlvdege; and a
'privilege tax is not a property tax within Const., art. XIII,
". §1;)and' other sections 'of the Constitution.
'

t'

,f

'

,PROCEEDING to review an order of the Superior, Court
of, ,Los Angeles County' adjudging guilt of contempt. Emmet
H. Wilson, Judge. Order annulled.
Irving M. Smith, City Attorney (Long Beach), and Roy J.
Brown and Frank C. C.harvat, Deputies City Attorney, for
Petitioners.
'
,J. H. O?Connor, County Counsel, W. B. MqKesson, Deputy
County Counsel, and George H. Emerson for 'Respondent.
[1] See 5 Cal. Jur. 918, 955; 10 Am. Jur. 538.
[2] See 7 Cal. Jur. 843.
t4] Property and other taxes distinguished; note, 103 A. L. R.
18. See, also, 24 Cal. Jur. 37; 26 R. C. L. 15.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Contempt, § 77; [2] Injunctions,
§ 91; [3] Injunctions, § 92; [4] Taxation, § 4 (1).
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TRAYNOR, J.-The Los Angeles County FloodContrQl
District owns certain real property in the channel of the Los
Angeles River located in the harbor district of the city of L()ng
Beach. In 1939 the Flood Control District entered into an
agreement with the Continental Corporation giving the latter
the right to operate oil wells upon the property. Certain ordinances of the city of Long Beach prohibited the operation of
oil wells within this area, and the officials of the city refused
to issue permits or to allow the operation of oil wells on the
Flood Control District's property. The Flood Control District and the Continental Corporation thereupon brought an
action against the city of Long Beach and certain of its officers
to enjoin the enforcement of all ordin'ances affecting the right
of plaintiffs to drill for oil. The trial court held that those
' ordinances entirely prohibiting plaintiffs from drilling for oil
upon the land in question were unreasonable and discriminatory and therefore invalid.
Ordinance C-1549 as amended by 0-1739 and ordinance
H. D. 22 as amended by, H. D. 38 required each perso~ drilling for oil in the harbor district of Long Beach to obtain a
permit from the board of harbor commissioners and to pay
that board a seven hundred and fifty dollar "Investigation and Permit Fee" and a one hundred and fifty dollar
"Annual Permit Renewal and Inspection Fee" each fiscal
year thereafter. The trial court found that these fees were
imposed I I for revenue as well as for regulation," that any
application for such a permit is made by the' Flood Control
District I I through its officers acting in their official capacities, "'a,nd that the fees are payable "for the performance of
official services of the officers named in said ordinances." It
concluded that the plaintiffs were entitled to obtain such
permits "without the payment of any of the fees prescribed
by said ordinances I I and enjoined defendants from "enforcing, seeking, or threatening to enforce: . . . the provisions
relating to the payment of fees ... in ... ordinance H. D.
number 22 as amended by ordinance H. D. number 38, and
ordinance C-1549 as amended by ordinance C-1739." No
appeal was taken from this judgment, and it has become final.
In compliance with the injunction, permits were issued to the
Flood Control District withbut payment of the fees required
by the ordinances.
In June, 1940, the city council of Long Beach passed ordinance C-1815 and ordinance C-1814, which by its terms pur-
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ported to amend ordinanceC-1549. At the same time the
board of harbor commissioners pas.'sed ordinance H. D. 55,
which purported to amend ordinance H. D. 22. These ordinances required the payment of license fees to the city clerk
of Long Beach by each person operating an oil well at any
place within the city· of Long Bcach. They eliminated the
previous requirement for the· payment of fees to the board
of harbor commissioners by persons operating oil wells within the harbor district of Long Beach and substituted for that
requirement the duty to pay to the city clerk the uniform
fees prescribed for the operation of wells throughout the city.
In January, 1941, after the enactment of the new ordinances, the Continental Corporation, on its own behalf and as
agent for the Los Angeles .County Flood Control District,
applied to the city clerk of Long Beach and to the board of
harbor commissioners for a permit to operate an oil well on
the property owned by the Flood Control DiStrict. Neither
application was accompanied by the fees prescribed in the
new ordinances, and, on the advice of the city attorney of
Long Beach, the board of harbor commissioners and the city
clerk refused to issue the permits. The Continental Corporation, acting through its vice president, thereupon filed in the
superior court an affidavit of contempt setting forth the judgment in the injunction proceeding, the passage of the amendatory ordinances, the application for the permit, and the intentional refusa,l of the defendants to issue the permit without
the payment of fees. The court held that the members of the
city council, the members of the board of harbor commissioners, the city clerk, the city attorney, and the deputy city
attorney had violated the injunction and were therefore guilty
of conte~pt. Defendants have petitioned for a writ of certiorari to annul the order of the trial court holding them
guilty of contempt.
. [1] The Jq.risdiction of a lower court to issue a final judgUlent of contempt may be reviewed on petition for a writ of
certiorari. (See cases cited in 5 Cal. Jur. 955.) It is settled
~hat the question whether the acts complained of can con.
stitute a contempt is a jurisdictional one for the purposes of
SU!lh review. (Mattos v. #uperior Court, 30 Cal. App. (2d)
641 .[86. P. (2d) 1056J; Jonesv. Superior Court, 88 Cal.
App. 253 [262 Pac. 1098J. See Times Mirror 00. v. Superior
Court,., 15 Cal. (2d) 99 [98 P. (2d) 1029J; and cases cited
~/5P~~ ;-!~. 9~8.), In th,e prescntcase there is. no dispute as
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to the facts. The question is whether the trial court could·
justifiably hold the petitioners guilty of contempt on the basis
of their acts as alleged in the affidavit of contempt and as
shown by the evidence. If these acts were not sufficient to
constitute a contempt, the judgment cannot stand.
[2] To hold a person guilty of contempt for violating an
injunction, the acts constituting the contempt must be clearly
and specifically prohibited by the terms of the injunction.
(Mattos v. Superior Court, supra, at 649 and cases there cited;
American Foundry &7 Mfg. Co. v. Josam Mfg. Co., 79 F.
(2d) 116, 118; City of Campbell v. Arkans(],s-Miss01tri Power
Co., 65 F. (2d) 425, 427-428.) The party bound by an injunction must be able to determinc from its terms what he may'
and may not do; he cannot be held guilty of contempt for violating an injunction that is uncertain or ambiguous (Ibid.),
just as he Inay not be held guilty of violating a criminal statute that fails to give him adequate notice of the prohibited
acts. (See caSes cited in 7 Cal. Jur. 843.)
[3a] In the present ease, therefore, the petitlOners are guilty
of contempt only if the acts complained of were clearly prohibited by the terms of the injunction. These acts consisted of
a refusal to issue to plaintiffs a permit for the operation of an
oil well without payment of the fees prescribed by the new
ordinances. Respondents contend that petitioners were enjoined from attempting to collect any fees from respondents
for the operation of oil wells. The injunction by its terms,
however, enjoins petitioners only from attempting to collect
from respondents those fees required by the old ordinances,
H. D. 22 as amended by H. D. 38 and C-1549 as amended by
C-1739. The findings of fact and conclusions of law do not
indicate that the injunction was any broader in scope. The
pertinent conclusion of law simply states that plaintiffs "are
entitled to have issued any permits required by ordinances
number C-1549, as amended by C-1739, H. D. number 22. as
amended by H. D. number 38 ... without the payment of
any of the fees prescribed by said ordinances." The findings
of fact state: "That ordinance H. D. number 22, as amended'
by ordinance H. D. number 38, and ordinance number C-1.549, .
as amended by ordinance number C-1739, require applicants
as defined in said ordinances to pay the fees therein provided
for the issuance of the permits described in said ordinances;.
that the amounts paid for said fees are imposed by said city
under said ordinances for revenue as well as for regulation;
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that if any permit is applied for by the plaintiff Los Angeles
County Flood Control District under any of said ordinances
for any operations to be carried on under the provisions of
the· drilling and operating agreement which is attached to
plaintiffs' Amendedand Supplemental Complaint and marked
Exhibit A, said District makes such application through its
officers acting in their official capacity, and the fees prescribed
by said ordinances are payable for the performance of official
services of the officers named in said ordinances."
Respondents contend that these findings constitute a holding
by the court that all fees of this type are prohibited by section
4295. of the Political Code, which provides: "State, county
ana'town:ship officers shall not perform any official services
unless upon the payment of such fees as are prescribed by law
for the performance of such services, except ... in the following cases: ... (2) ... neither the state nor any county, city
and county,city, district, or other political subdivision, nor
any public officer, or board or body, acting in his or its official
capacity on behalf of the 'state, or any county, city and county,
city, district or other political subdivision, shall be required
to payor deposit any fee for the filing of any document or ~
paper,. or for the performance of any official service." This
section is concerned with fees paid to state, county, and township officers and does not expressly apply to fees paid to
office:rs of cities. There is no clear and specific statement to
indicate to petitioners that the court based its decision upon
this section or that the injunction was intended to prohibit
the charging of any such fees under any ordinance rather
than just those provided for by the old ordinances.
[4] Respondents contend that the statement in the foregoing findings that the fees were imposed by the city "for
revenue as well as regulation" indicates the court was of the
opinion that under article XIII, section 1 of the California
Constitution no fees for revenue purposes can be imposed by
one political subdivision upon another. This section provides
that all property shall be taxed in proportion to its value and
"that property ... such as may belong to the United States,
this state, or to any county, city and county, or municipal
corporation WAthin this state shall be exempt from taxation .. ." If the fee required by the ordinances under consideration is a tax, however, it is not a tax upon the value oi
the property owned by the Flood Control District but a tax
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upon the privilege of drilling for oil. It is settled that a
privilege tax is not a property tax within the meaning of this
and other sections of the Constitution. (Ingels v. Riley, 5 Cal.
(2d) 154 [53 P. (2d) 939, 103 A. L. R. 1] ; Aircraft Co. Inc.
v. Johnson, 13 Cal. (2d) 545 [90 P. (2d) 572] ; Kaiser Land
&7 Fruit Co. v. Curry, 155 Cal. 638, 650-654 [103 Pac. 841] ;
Los Angeles v. Los A.ngeles etc. 00., 152 Cal. 765, 767 [93 Pac.
1006] ; McAdams Oil Co. v. Los Angeles, 32 Cal. App. (2d)
359 [89 P. (2d) 729]; Roth Drug, Inc. v. Johnson, 13 Cal.
App. (2d) 720 [57 P.(2d) 1022]; See cases cited in note,
103 A. L. R. 35 et seq.) If the lower court was of the opinion
that this constitutional provision prohibited all fees in the
nature of the ones in question, it failed to give any indication
sufficient to charge petitioners with notice that the injunction
extended to all such fees. rather than just those required by
the old ordinances.
[3b] It is thus clear that the injunction enjoined petitioners from collecting from plaintiffs only those fees required
by the old ordinances. Petitioners, however, could not evade
the injunction by the subterfuge of enacting new ordinances
that did not materially differ from the old ones. (Perry v.
Kinnear, 42 Ill. 160, 162-3; Ray v. Parish of Rapides, 170 La.
644 [128 So. 663] ; see cases cited in 32 C. J. 493-4, § 860.)
Their attempt to collect fees under the new ordinances. would
constitute contempt of court if the new ordinances were not
substantially different from the old. A comparison of the oid
ordinances with the new, however, reveals the following material differences: (1) The new ordinances require license
fees for oil operations anywhere in the city of Long Beach
whereas the old ordinances were effective only in the harbor
district of the city. Thus, the old ordinances were discriminatory while the new ones are uniform in operation. (2) Under
the new ordinances the fees are payable to the city clerk and
become part of the general funds of the city, whereas under
the old ordinances the fees were paid to the board of harbor
commissioners and become part of the harbor revenue fund.
Since the general funds ·of the city enable it to furnish services such as police and fire protection, street maintenance,
building inspection, and health and sanitary facilities, the
fees paid under the new ordinances are used to furnish special
services for the benefit of thbse to whom the permits are issued,
whereas under the old ordinances the fees collected could be
expended only by the board of harbor commissionersexclu_
sively for harbor purposes.
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[311., 3b] Oompromise and Settlement-Pleading.-A pleading suf-

ficiently alleges a compromise and settlement of a controversy
where it alleges (1) that under a consignment contrnct the
pleader would have made a certain profit during the term
thereof, (2) a dispute as to the right to have the contract
continue and be secured by a mortgage during the term, (3)
a consideration, and (4) an offer and acceptance, and where
it appears that the dispute was in good faith and that the
claim was not illegal.
[4] ld.-Claims Oompromisable.-The consideration necessary to
support a compromise need not always consist of the surrender
of a claim that is necessarily legally valid and enforceable.
[5] Accord and Satisfaction-Oharacter of Dispute.-There is an
accord and satisfaction where there is a bona fide dispute as
to a claim, where money is paid and a release given, and this,
irrespective of the legal enforceability of the claim.

Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., and Carter, J., ~.onc:urred.

[L. A. No. 17715. In Bank. Apr. 22, 1942.]

APPEAL from a judgment .of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Peirson M. Hall, Judge. Reversed.

I. A. STUB et al., Resp.ondents, v. FRANK BELMONT,
Appellant.

McK.Dig. References: [1] Mortgage!!, § 72; [2] Chattel Mortgages,' § 64; [3], Compromise and Settlement, § 11; [4] Compromise
and Settlement, § a; [5] Accord Il.lid Satisfaction, § 7.

v .. BELMONT

[20 O. (2d) 208]

In view of the material differences between the new ordinances and the old, petitioners cannot be held guilty of
violating an injunction that prohibited them from attempting to collect the fees required by the old ordinances. The
validity of the new ordinances is not now before this court.
Piaintiffs are free to. test their validity by appropriate proceedings.
The .order is annulled and petiti.oners are discharged.

[1] Mortgages - Debt or Obligation Secured - Obligation Other ;.,..,
than Debt.-At least as between the mortgagor and mortgagee,
a mortgage on either chattels or real property, given as security for the performance .of a contract, is valid and proper,
and may stll-nd' as security for such performance. (See Civ.
Co.de, § 2920.), (Hayashi v. Pacific Fruit Exchange, 43 Cal.
~pp: .677, 186Pac. 174, disapproved.)
[2]. Ohattel Mortgages -:-. Extinguishment - Discharge of Obliga.;tion....;,..Oonsig~entOpntract.-Where a note, chattel mortgage
. and 60nsjgnmept con~ract are given as part of a single trans.action, where the mortgage, although making the contract a
part thereof, expressly provides that it is given as security for
'a loan and advances and also, for performance of the contract,
where the contract is supported in part by an adequate inde.(, pendent consideration, and where it appears that the mortgageeconsignee would benefit therefrom for aflxed period in
. add~tion to, receiving the amount of his loan and advancements, ,the consjgnment' is not merely an additional method
of preserving ,the security, but is secured by the mortgage,
and the mere discharge of the loan and advances does not
entitle' the mortgagor to a satisfaction of the mortg!lge.

STUB

Acti.on to recover money paid for cancellati.on of a contract
and to recover a statutory penalty f.or failure to give a satisfaction of a mortgage on payment thereof. Judgment for the
plaintiffs on the pleadings" reversed.
Henry O. Wackerbarth for Appellant.
Monta W. Shirley and Tayl.orH. Snow f.or Respondents.
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CARTER, J.-Defendant appeals' fr.om a judgment for
$2,000 and a penalty of $100 entered against him pursuant
to plaintiffs' motion f.or judgment on the pleadings. The
penalty of $100 wasaw,arded pursuant t.o secti.on 2941 .of the
Civil Code providing therefor in cases where a m.ortgagee
fails to give to the mortgagor a satisfaction of mortgage upon
the payment thereof.
The f.ollowing facts appear fr.om the affirmative allegations
in defendant's answer, which must be taken as true in entertaining a motion for judgment on the pleadings (Ouneo v.
Lawson, 203 Cal. IflO [263 Pac. 530)), and the undenied allegations of plaintiffs' complaint. Plaintiff Underwood obtained
titlfl to an orange grove, having purchased it from a Mr.
[4] See 5 011.1. Jur. 391; 11 Am. Ju,r. 25L

